This chapter critically reviews the literature which explains why and under which
circumstances governments accumulate more debt than it would be consistent with optimal …

This paper surveys recent literature, both theoretical and empirical, regarding political
explanations for fiscal deficits. Political economy suggests conflicts of interest may lie behind …

This book represents a considerable revision and expansion of Public Choice II (1989). As
in the previous additions, all of the major topics of public choice are covered. These include …

In the last thirty years several OECD economies have accumulated large public debts. In
fact, table 1.1 shows a very large variance in debt/GNP ratios in OECD countries, much …

Public spending is a story of some people spending other people's money. In modern
democracies, voters elect politicians to make decisions about public spending for them, and …

In recent years, academics and policymakers have shown increasing interest in the
independence of central banks with respect to the formulation of monetary policy. In the …

This paper uses a new data set on budgetary institutions in Europe to examine the impact of
fiscal rules and budget procedures in EU countries on public finances. It briefly describes the …

This paper explores on a panel of 19 OECD countries the role of fragmentation in
determining fiscal outcomes over the 1970–95 period. We first define the notion of …

A rough consensus has emerged that states with proportional representation systems are"
likely to run larger deficits than plurality states. We argue that electoral institutions matter …

The book shows how such multiple interactions among political-economic institutions and
interests induce differing policy choices and effects across democracies; how to model such …