Most solution concepts in collective decision making are defined assuming complete
knowledge of individuals' preferences and of the mechanism used for aggregating them …

The presence of big data, online systems, collaborations of remote agents, distributed
knowledge, social media interaction, and generally, digital globalization, changes the way …

Bribery in elections is an important problem in computational social choice theory. We
introduce and study two important special cases of the classical $ Bribery problem, namely …

This article deals with strategic voting under incomplete information. We propose a
descriptive model, inspired by political elections, where the information about the vote …

Understanding when and how computational complexity can be used to protect elections
against different manipulative actions has been a highly active research area over the past …

Gerrymandering is a practice of manipulating district boundaries and locations in order to
achieve a political advantage for a particular party. Lewenberg, Lev, and Rosenschein …

We study strategic voting problems for majority judgment, in which each voter assigns to
every candidate a grade and the winners are determined by their majority-grades. We first …

ABSTRACT The Possible Winner (PW) problem, a fundamental algorithmic problem in
computational social choice, concerns elections where voters express only partial …

Many research works in computational social choice assume a fixed set of voters in an
election and study the resistance of different voting rules against electoral manipulation. In …

We consider the problem of individual manipulation under incomplete information, when
voters do not know a full preference profile. Instead, voters know the result of an opinion poll …