Multiwinner voting: A new challenge for social choice theory

P Faliszewski, P Skowron, A Slinko… - … in computational social …, 2017 - books.google.com
There are many reasons why societies run elections. For example, a given society may need
to select its leader (eg, a president), members of a team may need to find an appropriate …

Structured preferences

E Elkind, M Lackner, D Peters - Trends in computational social …, 2017 - books.google.com
In a typical social choice scenario, agents rank the available alternatives and have to
collectively decide on the best alternative, or a ranking of the alternatives. If there are just …

Properties of multiwinner voting rules

E Elkind, P Faliszewski, P Skowron, A Slinko - Social Choice and Welfare, 2017 - Springer
A committee selection rule (or, multiwinner voting rule) is a map** that takes a collection of
strict preference rankings and a positive integer k as input, and outputs one or more subsets …

Justified representation in approval-based committee voting

H Aziz, M Brill, V Conitzer, E Elkind, R Freeman… - Social Choice and …, 2017 - Springer
We consider approval-based committee voting, ie the setting where each voter approves a
subset of candidates, and these votes are then used to select a fixed-size set of winners …

Proportionality and the limits of welfarism

D Peters, P Skowron - Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on …, 2020 - dl.acm.org
We study two influential voting rules proposed in the 1890s by Phragmen and Thiele, which
elect a committee of k candidates which proportionally represents the voters. Voters provide …

Proportional justified representation

L Sánchez-Fernández, E Elkind, M Lackner… - Proceedings of the …, 2017 - ojs.aaai.org
The goal of multi-winner elections is to choose a fixed-size committee based on voters'
preferences. An important concern in this setting is representation: large groups of voters …

[HTML][HTML] Finding a collective set of items: From proportional multirepresentation to group recommendation

P Skowron, P Faliszewski, J Lang - Artificial Intelligence, 2016 - Elsevier
We consider the following problem: There is a set of items (eg, movies) and a group of
agents (eg, passengers on a plane); each agent has some intrinsic utility for each of the …

Preference restrictions in computational social choice: A survey

E Elkind, M Lackner, D Peters - arxiv preprint arxiv:2205.09092, 2022 - arxiv.org
Social choice becomes easier on restricted preference domains such as single-peaked,
single-crossing, and Euclidean preferences. Many impossibility theorems disappear, the …

Phragmén's voting methods and justified representation

M Brill, R Freeman, S Janson, M Lackner - Mathematical programming, 2024 - Springer
In the late 19th century, Swedish mathematician Edvard Phragmén proposed a load-
balancing approach for selecting committees based on approval ballots. We consider three …

On the complexity of extended and proportional justified representation

H Aziz, E Elkind, S Huang, M Lackner… - Proceedings of the …, 2018 - ojs.aaai.org
We consider the problem of selecting a fixed-size committee based on approval ballots. It is
desirable to have a committee in which all voters are fairly represented. Aziz et al.(2015a; …