Side-channel attacks have become a severe threat to the confidentiality of computer
applications and systems. One popular type of such attacks is the microarchitectural attack …

Microarchitectural vulnerabilities, such as Meltdown and Spectre, exploit subtle
microarchitecture state to steal the user's secret data and even compromise the operating …

We present an effective implementation of the Prime+ Probe side-channel attack against the
last-level cache. We measure the capacity of the covert channel the attack creates and …

Cache side-channel attacks can be leveraged as a building block in attacks leaking secrets
even in the absence of software bugs. Currently, there are no practical and generic …

Microarchitectural timing channels expose hidden hardware states though timing. We survey
recent attacks that exploit microarchitectural features in shared hardware, especially as they …

Simultaneous Multithreading (SMT) architectures are attractive targets for side-channel
enabled attackers, with their inherently broader attack surface that exposes more per …

Sharing memory pages between non-trusting processes is a common method of reducing
the memory footprint of multi-tenanted systems. In this paper we demonstrate that, due to a …

Recent work on cache attacks has shown that CPU caches represent a powerful source of
information leakage. However, existing attacks require manual identification of …

Numerous recent works have experimentally shown that Intel Software Guard Extensions
(SGX) are vulnerable to cache timing and page table side-channel attacks which could be …

The scatter–gather technique is a commonly implemented approach to prevent cache-based
timing attacks. In this paper, we show that scatter–gather is not constant time. We implement …