Procurement of an innovation often requires substantial effort by potential suppliers.
Motivating effort may be difficult if the level of effort and quality of the resulting innovation are …

We present a competing-auction theory of the labor market, where job candidates auction
their labor services to employers. An equilibrium matching function emerges which has …

Suppose that risk neutral agents have independently (and perhaps asymmetrically)
distributed private valuations for an indivisible object. A mechanism assigns the object, but it …

A dynamic model of intergovernmental competition for a large plant is presented, when local
productivity is uncertain. One firm determines the location of its plant in each period by …

We investigate equilibria of sealed-bid second price auctions with bidder participation costs
in the independent private values environment. We focus on equilibria in cutoff strategies …

We derive the symmetric, revenue-maximizing allocation of several units among agents who
take costly actions that influence their values. The problem is equivalent to a reduced-form …

Committing to prices that result in rationing may be more profitable than setting market-
clearing prices if customers must make sunk investments to enter the market. Rationing is ex …

Among the many business processes in the modem firm or adopted by the contemporary
public agency, the sourcing process is probably the most affected by changes brought about …

This paper studies procurement contracts where a buyer can either divide full production
among multiple suppliers or award the entire production to a single supplier. We examine …

We show that economic conclusions derived from Bulow and Roberts (1989) for linear utility
models approximately extend to non-linear utility models. Specifically, we quantify the extent …