We revisit the classic problem of fair division from a mechanism design perspective and
provide an elegant truthful mechanism that yields surprisingly good approximation …

We study the fair division problem on divisible heterogeneous resources (the cake cutting
problem) with strategic agents, where each agent can manipulate his/her private valuation in …

We consider a setting in which a single divisible good (" cake") needs to be divided between
n players, each with a possibly different valuation function over pieces of the cake. For this …

We draw a surprising and direct mathematical equivalence between the class of fair division
mechanisms, designed to allocate divisible goods without money, and the class of weakly …

We study the problem in which a central planner sequentially allocates a single resource to
multiple strategic agents using their utility reports at each round, but without using any …

We study the problem of allocating divisible resources among $ n $ agents, hopefully in a
fair and efficient manner. With the presence of strategic agents, additional incentive …

We study the Price of Anarchy of mechanisms for the well-known problem of one-sided
matching, or house allocation, with respect to the social welfare objective. We consider both …

We study learning-based design of fair allocation mechanisms for divisible resources, using
proportional fairness (PF) as a benchmark. The learning setting is a significant departure …

We consider the egalitarian welfare aspects of random assignment mechanisms when
agents have unrestricted cardinal utilities over the objects. We give bounds on how well …

Consider the problem of allocating multiple divisible goods to two agents in a strategy-proof
fashion without the use of payments or priors. Previous work [1, 2] has aimed at …