Abstract Throughout its history, Operational Research has evolved to include methods,
models and algorithms that have been applied to a wide range of contexts. This …

We study the question of whether local incentive constraints are sufficient to imply full
incentive compatibility in a variety of mechanism design settings, allowing for probabilistic …

Auctions via social network, pioneered by Li et al.(2017), have been attracting considerable
attention in the literature of mechanism design for auctions. However, no known mechanism …

Conjugate duality relationships are pervasive in matching and implementation problems
and provide much of the structure essential for characterizing stable matches and …

We consider a model where each agent has an outside option of privately known value. At a
given allocation, we call the set of agents who do not exercise their outside options the …

An important question in mechanism design is whether there is any theoretical foundation
for the use of dominant-strategy mechanisms. This paper studies the maxmin and Bayesian …

We consider vertical contracting arrangements between a manufacturer and a retailing
network when retailers have private information and the organization is run through bilateral …

Consider an environment with a finite number of alternatives, and agents with private values
and quasilinear utility functions. A domain of valuation functions for an agent is a …

Drawing on classical insights from mechanism design, we show that ex post efficient
mechanisms induce agents to make efficient ex ante investment choices if and only if they …

We study mechanism design problems in quasi-linear environments where the envelope
theorem and revenue equivalence principle fail due to non-convex and non-differentiable …