TRUSTS: Scheduling randomized patrols for fare inspection in transit systems using game theory

Z Yin, AX Jiang, M Tambe, C Kiekintveld… - AI magazine, 2012‏ - ojs.aaai.org
In proof-of-payment transit systems, passengers are legally required to purchase tickets
before entering but are not physically forced to do so. Instead, patrol units move about the …

Estimating Agent Skill in Continuous Action Domains

C Archibald, D Nieves-Rivera - Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 2024‏ - jair.org
Actions in most real-world continuous domains cannot be executed exactly. An agent's
performance in these domains is influenced by two critical factors: the ability to select …

[PDF][PDF] Towards Optimal Patrol Strategies for Fare Inspection in Transit Systems.

AX Jiang, Z Yin, MP Johnson, M Tambe… - … : game theory for …, 2012‏ - cdn.aaai.org
In some urban transit systems, passengers are legally required to purchase tickets before
entering but are not physically forced to do so. Instead, patrol units move about through the …

Approximate Estimation of High-dimension Execution Skill for Dynamic Agents in Continuous Domains

D Nieves-Rivera, C Archibald - arxiv preprint arxiv:2408.10512, 2024‏ - arxiv.org
In many real-world continuous action domains, human agents must decide which actions to
attempt and then execute those actions to the best of their ability. However, humans cannot …

Addressing uncertainty in Stackelberg games for security: Models and algorithms

Z Yin - 2013‏ - search.proquest.com
Recently, there has been significant research interest in using game-theoretic approaches to
allocate limited security resources to protect physical infrastructure including ports, airports …

Thwarting Adversaries with Unpredictability: Massive-scale Game-Theoretic Algorithms for Real-world Security Deployments

M Jain - 2013‏ - search.proquest.com
Protecting critical infrastructure and targets such as airports, transportation networks, power
generation facilities as well as critical natural resources and endangered species is an …

[PDF][PDF] Addressing Execution and Observation Error in Security Games.

M Jain, Z Yin, M Tambe, F Ordóñez - Applied Adversarial Reasoning …, 2011‏ - cdn.aaai.org
Attacker-defender Stackelberg games have become a popular game-theoretic approach for
security with deployments for LAX Police, the FAMS and the TSA. Unfortunately, most of the …

Computational model of human behavior in security games with varying number of targets

M Goenka - 2011‏ - search.proquest.com
Security is one of the biggest concerns all around the world. There are only a limited number
of resources that can be allocated in security coverage. Terrorists can exploit any pattern of …

[فهرست منابع][C] Scaling up security games: Algorithms and applications

[فهرست منابع][C] Geometric Security Games

G Andersen, J Pan - 2014