The literature on algorithmic mechanism design is mostly concerned with game-theoretic
versions of optimization problems to which standard economic money-based mechanisms …

Modern recommender systems lie at the heart of complex ecosystems that couple the
behavior of users, content providers, advertisers, and other actors. Despite this, the focus of …

This book offers a self-sufficient treatment of a key tool, game theory and mechanism design,
to model, analyze, and solve centralized as well as decentralized design problems involving …

Mechanism design is now a standard tool in computer science for aligning the incentives of
self-interested agents with the objectives of a system designer. There is, however, a …

We consider the problem of locating facilities in a metric space to serve a set of selfish
agents. The cost of an agent is the distance between her own location and the nearest …

This volume was born from the experience of the authors as researchers and educators,
which suggests that many students of data mining are handicapped in their research by the …

This survey outlines a general and modular theory for proving approximation guarantees for
equilibria of auctions in complex settings. This theory complements traditional economic …

We consider K-Facility Location games, where n strategic agents report their locations in a
metric space and a mechanism maps them to K facilities. The agents seek to minimize their …

This paper proposes a nonmonetary traffic demand management scheme, named CARMA,
as a fair solution to the morning commute congestion. We consider heterogeneous …

We study the implementation challenge in an abstract interdependent values model and an
arbitrary objective function. We design a generic mechanism that allows for approximate …