The study of approximate mechanism design for facility location problems has been in the
center of research at the intersection of artificial intelligence and economics for the last …

The literature on algorithmic mechanism design is mostly concerned with game-theoretic
versions of optimization problems to which standard economic money-based mechanisms …

We consider K-Facility Location games, where n strategic agents report their locations in a
metric space and a mechanism maps them to K facilities. The agents seek to minimize their …

We study the implementation challenge in an abstract interdependent values model and an
arbitrary objective function. We design a generic mechanism that allows for approximate …

We consider the problem of locating a public facility on a tree, where a set of n strategic
agents report their locations and a mechanism determines, either deterministically or …

In this paper, we focus on the facility location games with the property of dual preference.
Dual preference property indicates that both two preferences of agents, staying close to and …

We consider a single-facility location problem, where agents are positioned on the real line
and are partitioned into multiple disjoint districts. The goal is to choose a location (where a …

We study the problem of locating a single facility on a real line based on the reports of self-
interested agents, when agents have double-peaked preferences, with the peaks being on …

We study heterogeneous $ k $-facility location games. In this model there are $ k $ facilities
where each facility serves a different purpose. Thus, the preferences of the agents over the …

We consider k-Facility Location games, where n strategic agents report their locations on the
real line, and a mechanism maps them to k facilities. Each agent seeks to minimize his …