Address space layout randomization (ASLR) is an important first line of defense against
memory corruption attacks and a building block for many modern countermeasures. Existing …

Run-time attacks against programs written in memory-unsafe programming languages (eg,
C and C++) remain a prominent threat against computer systems. The prevalence of …

In the absence of hardware-supported segmentation, many state-of-the-art defenses resort
to “hiding” sensitive information at a random location in a very large address space. This …

It is a well-known issue that attack primitives which exploit memory corruption vulnerabilities
can abuse the ability of processes to automatically restart upon termination. For example …

Modern software systems make extensive use of libraries derived from C and C++. Because
of the lack of memory safety in these languages, however, the libraries may suffer from …

The operating system kernel is often the security foundation for the whole system. To prevent
attacks, control-flow integrity (CFI) has been proposed to ensure that any control transfer …

Lack of memory safety in commonly used systems-level languages such as C and C++
results in a constant stream of new exploitable software vulnerabilities and exploit …

Modern code reuse attacks take full advantage of bloated software. Attackers piece together
short sequences of instructions in otherwise benign code to carry out malicious actions …

As human activities have moved to the digital domain, so have all the well-known malicious
behaviors including fraud, theft, and other trickery. There is no silver bullet, and each …

Many modern defenses against code reuse rely on hiding sensitive data such as shadow
stacks in a huge memory address space. While much more efficient than traditional integrity …