A survey on data pricing: from economics to data science

J Pei - IEEE Transactions on knowledge and Data …, 2020 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
Data are invaluable. How can we assess the value of data objectively, systematically and
quantitatively? Pricing data, or information goods in general, has been studied and practiced …

[ΒΙΒΛΙΟ][B] Multiagent systems: Algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations

Y Shoham, K Leyton-Brown - 2008 - books.google.com
Multiagent systems combine multiple autonomous entities, each having diverging interests
or different information. This overview of the field offers a computer science perspective, but …

Mechanism design via differential privacy

F McSherry, K Talwar - 48th Annual IEEE Symposium on …, 2007 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
We study the role that privacy-preserving algorithms, which prevent the leakage of specific
information about participants, can play in the design of mechanisms for strategic agents …

Foundations of transaction fee mechanism design

H Chung, E Shi - Proceedings of the 2023 Annual ACM-SIAM …, 2023 - SIAM
In blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum, users compete in a transaction fee auction to
get their transactions confirmed in the next block. A line of recent works set forth the …

How to crowdsource tasks truthfully without sacrificing utility: Online incentive mechanisms with budget constraint

D Zhao, XY Li, H Ma - IEEE INFOCOM 2014-IEEE Conference …, 2014 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
Mobile crowdsourced sensing (MCS) is a new paradigm which takes advantage of
pervasive smartphones to efficiently collect data, enabling numerous novel applications. To …

Data market platforms: Trading data assets to solve data problems

RC Fernandez, P Subramaniam… - arxiv preprint arxiv …, 2020 - arxiv.org
Data only generates value for a few organizations with expertise and resources to make
data shareable, discoverable, and easy to integrate. Sharing data that is easy to discover …

The sample complexity of revenue maximization

R Cole, T Roughgarden - Proceedings of the forty-sixth annual ACM …, 2014 - dl.acm.org
In the design and analysis of revenue-maximizing auctions, auction performance is typically
measured with respect to a prior distribution over inputs. The most obvious source for such a …

A deep reinforcement learning framework for rebalancing dockless bike sharing systems

L Pan, Q Cai, Z Fang, P Tang, L Huang - … of the AAAI conference on artificial …, 2019 - aaai.org
Bike sharing provides an environment-friendly way for traveling and is booming all over the
world. Yet, due to the high similarity of user travel patterns, the bike imbalance problem …

Truthful incentives in crowdsourcing tasks using regret minimization mechanisms

A Singla, A Krause - Proceedings of the 22nd international conference …, 2013 - dl.acm.org
What price should be offered to a worker for a task in an online labor market? How can one
enable workers to express the amount they desire to receive for the task completion …

The value of knowing a demand curve: Bounds on regret for online posted-price auctions

R Kleinberg, T Leighton - 44th Annual IEEE Symposium on …, 2003 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
We consider price-setting algorithms for a simple market in which a seller has an unlimited
supply of identical copies of some good, and interacts sequentially with a pool of n buyers …