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Preference restrictions in computational social choice: A survey
Social choice becomes easier on restricted preference domains such as single-peaked,
single-crossing, and Euclidean preferences. Many impossibility theorems disappear, the …
single-crossing, and Euclidean preferences. Many impossibility theorems disappear, the …
Host community respecting refugee housing
We propose a novel model for refugee housing respecting the preferences of accepting
community and refugees themselves. In particular, we are given a topology representing the …
community and refugees themselves. In particular, we are given a topology representing the …
Control complexity in Borda elections: Solving all open cases of offline control and some cases of online control
Borda Count is one of the earliest and most important voting rules and has been central to
many applications in artificial intelligence. We study the problem of control in Borda …
many applications in artificial intelligence. We study the problem of control in Borda …
[HTML][HTML] The control complexity of r-approval: from the single-peaked case to the general case
Y Yang, J Guo - Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 2017 - Elsevier
We investigate the complexity of r-Approval control problems in k-peaked elections, where at
most k peaks are allowed in each vote with respect to an order of the candidates. Our study …
most k peaks are allowed in each vote with respect to an order of the candidates. Our study …
On the complexity of constructive control under nearly single-peaked preferences
Y Yang - ECAI 2020, 2020 - ebooks.iospress.nl
We investigate the complexity of CONSTRUCTIVE CONTROL BY ADDING/DELETING
VOTES (CCAV/CCDV) for r-approval, Condorcet, Maximin, and Copeland α in k-axes and k …
VOTES (CCAV/CCDV) for r-approval, Condorcet, Maximin, and Copeland α in k-axes and k …
Hardness of candidate nomination
We consider elections where the set of candidates is split into parties and each party can
nominate just one candidate. We study the computational complexity of two problems. The …
nominate just one candidate. We study the computational complexity of two problems. The …
On treewidth and stable marriage: parameterized algorithms and hardness results (complete characterization)
Stable Marriage is a fundamental problem to both computer science and economics. Four
well-known NP-hard optimization versions of this problem are the Sex-Equal Stable …
well-known NP-hard optimization versions of this problem are the Sex-Equal Stable …
Optimal defense against election control by deleting voter groups
Election control encompasses attempts from an external agent to alter the structure of an
election in order to change its outcome. This problem is both a fundamental theoretical …
election in order to change its outcome. This problem is both a fundamental theoretical …
[PDF][PDF] Anyone but them: The complexity challenge for a resolute election controller
We study the voting problems where given is an election associated with a subset J of
candidates, and the question is whether we can modify the election in a way so that none of …
candidates, and the question is whether we can modify the election in a way so that none of …
[PDF][PDF] On the complexity of controlling amendment and successive winners
Y Yang - Proceedings of the 21st International Conference on …, 2022 - ifaamas.org
Successive and amendment are two important sequential voting procedures widely used in
parliamentary and legislative decision making. They have been extensively studied in the …
parliamentary and legislative decision making. They have been extensively studied in the …