Price discrimination and competition

LA Stole - Handbook of industrial organization, 2007‏ - Elsevier
This chapter surveys the developments in price discrimination theory as it applies to
imperfectly competitive markets. Broad themes and conclusions are discussed in the areas …

Recent developments in the theory of regulation

M Armstrong, DEM Sap**ton - Handbook of industrial organization, 2007‏ - Elsevier
This chapter reviews recent theoretical work on the design of regulatory policy, focusing on
the complications that arise when regulated suppliers have better information about the …

Dynamic mechanism design: A myersonian approach

A Pavan, I Segal, J Toikka - Econometrica, 2014‏ - Wiley Online Library
We study mechanism design in dynamic quasilinear environments where private information
arrives over time and decisions are made over multiple periods. We make three …

Performance pay and multidimensional sorting: Productivity, preferences, and gender

T Dohmen, A Falk - American economic review, 2011‏ - aeaweb.org
This paper studies the impact of incentives on worker self-selection in a controlled laboratory
experiment. Subjects face the choice between a fixed and a variable payment scheme …

The dynamics of incentive contracts

JJ Laffont, J Tirole - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1988‏ - JSTOR
The paper studies a simple two-period principal/agent model in which the principal updates
the incentive scheme after observing the agent's first-period performance. The agent has …

Customer poaching and brand switching

D Fudenberg, J Tirole - RAND Journal of Economics, 2000‏ - JSTOR
Firms sometimes try to" poach" the customers of their competitors by offering them
inducements to switch. We analyze duopoly poaching under both short-term and long-term …

Optimal information disclosure in auctions and the handicap auction

P Eső, B Szentes - The Review of Economic Studies, 2007‏ - academic.oup.com
We analyse a situation where a monopolist is selling an indivisible good to risk-neutral
buyers who only have an estimate of their private valuations. The seller can release, without …

Sequential screening

P Courty, L Hao - The Review of Economic Studies, 2000‏ - academic.oup.com
We study price discrimination where consumers know at the time of contracting only the
distribution of their valuations but subsequently learn their actual valuations. Consumers are …

Dynamic mechanism design: An introduction

D Bergemann, J Välimäki - Journal of Economic Literature, 2019‏ - aeaweb.org
We provide an introduction to the recent developments of dynamic mechanism design, with
a primary focus on the quasilinear case. First, we describe socially optimal (or efficient) …

Planning under incomplete information and the ratchet effect

X Freixas, R Guesnerie, J Tirole - The review of economic …, 1985‏ - academic.oup.com
Central planning of production is usually performed under asymmetric information which
leads to use of an incentive scheme. As the planner revises the scheme over time to take …