Memory corruption errors in C/C++ programs remain the most common source of security
vulnerabilities in today's systems. Control-flow hijacking attacks exploit memory corruption …

As control-flow hijacking defenses gain adoption, it is important to understand the remaining
capabilities of adversaries via memory exploits. Non-control data exploits are used to mount …

WebAssembly is an increasingly popular compilation target designed to run code in
browsers and on other platforms safely and securely, by strictly separating code and data …

In this chapter, we describe code-pointer integrity (CPI), a new design point that guarantees
the integrity of all code pointers in a program (eg, function pointers, saved return addresses) …

Despite decades of sustained effort, memory corruption attacks continue to be one of the
most serious security threats faced today. They are highly sought after by attackers, as they …

Control-Flow Hijacking attacks are the dominant attack vector against C/C++ programs.
Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) solutions mitigate these attacks on the forward edge, ie, indirect …

Run-time attacks against programs written in memory-unsafe programming languages (eg,
C and C++) remain a prominent threat against computer systems. The prevalence of …

Current binary-level Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) techniques are weak in determining the set
of valid targets for indirect control flow transfers on the forward edge. In particular, the lack of …

It is well-known that static disassembly is an unsolved problem, but how much of a problem
is it in real software—for instance, for binary protection schemes? This work studies the …

With the widespread deployment of Control-Flow Integrity (CFI), control-flow hijacking
attacks, and consequently code reuse attacks, are significantly more difficult. CFI limits …