An analysis of the loss in performance caused by selfish, uncoordinated behavior in
networks. Most of us prefer to commute by the shortest route available, without taking into …

We consider the pricing problem faced by a revenue-maximizing platform matching price-
sensitive customers to flexible supply units within a geographic area. This can be interpreted …

The essence of the routing problem in real networks is that the traffic demand from a source
to destination must be satisfied by choosing a single path between source and destination …

We consider multi-player repeated games involving a large number of players with large
strategy spaces and enmeshed utility structures. In these ldquolarge-scalerdquo games …

We study the problem of optimizing the performance of a system shared by selfish,
noncooperative users. We consider the concrete setting of scheduling jobs on a set of …

Peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing networks are an important medium for the distribution of
information goods. However, there is little empirical research into the optimal design of these …

We prove the existence of tolls to induce multicommodity, heterogeneous network users that
independently choose routes minimizing their own linear function of tolls versus latency to …

We study economic incentives for influencing selfish behavior in networks. We consider a
model of selfish routing in which the latency experienced by network traffic on an edge of the …

Publisher Summary This chapter presents the main theoretical and algorithmical results
pertaining to the traffic equilibrium problem (TEP), along the way improving theoretical …

We consider a directed network in which every edge possesses a latency function that
specifies the time needed to traverse the edge given its congestion. Selfish, noncooperative …