Evolutionary game theory: A renaissance

J Newton - Games, 2018 - mdpi.com
Economic agents are not always rational or farsighted and can make decisions according to
simple behavioral rules that vary according to situation and can be studied using the tools of …

[HTML][HTML] Conflict initiation function shapes the evolution of persistent outcomes in group conflict

E Bilancini, L Boncinelli, P Marcos-Prieto - European Economic Review, 2024 - Elsevier
We take an evolutionary perspective to explore the implications of different relationships
between power and initiation of conflicts (ie, conflict initiation function) for the long-run …

[書籍][B] " Our Word Is Our Weapon": Text-Analyzing Wars of Ideas from the French Revolution to the First World War

J Jacobs - 2022 - search.proquest.com
What are political thinkers doing with their words when they write a text, engage in a debate,
or give a speech? We propose a" computational political theory", pairing recent …

Foreshadowing Mars: Religiosity and conflict in pre-Enlightenment Europe

L Barber, M Jetter, T Krieger - Available at SSRN 4625682, 2024 - papers.ssrn.com
Can religiosity alter societal propensity for large-scale organized violence? We introduce
annual religiosity measures for several pre-Enlightenment European states with the shares …

On the Post-Enlightenment Evolution of Moral Universalism

M Jetter - 2024 - papers.ssrn.com
Is humanity's circle of moral concern expanding, as often claimed? I explore frequencies of
morally universal language in 15m book publications in American English, British English …

[PDF][PDF] Foreshadowing Mars: Religiosity and pre-Enlightenment conflict in Europe

L Barber, M Jetter, T Krieger - 2024 - econstor.eu
Can religiosity alter a society's propensity for violence against outgroups? We first introduce
two state-year-level religiosity measures for several pre-Enlightenment European states with …

Why can't we be friends? An evolutionary approach to ethno-cultural hierarchies

L Letrouit - 2021 - hal.science
The share of ethno-cultural minorities is growing in world metropolises, thereby aecting
intergroup relationships and altering ethno-cultural hierarchies. Some empirical studies …

Competing conventions with costly information acquisition

R Rozzi - Games, 2021 - mdpi.com
We consider an evolutionary model of social coordination in a 2× 2 game where two groups
of players prefer to coordinate on different actions. Players can pay a cost to learn their …

Positive feedback in coordination games: Stochastic evolutionary dynamics and the logit choice rule

SH Hwang, L Rey-Bellet - Games and Economic Behavior, 2021 - Elsevier
We study the problem of stochastic stability for evolutionary dynamics under the logit choice
rule. We consider general classes of coordination games, symmetric or asymmetric, with an …

Interaction as the Source of Inequality

P Molander - The Origins of Inequality: Mechanisms, Models, Policy, 2022 - Springer
This chapter changes the perspective from the individual to the social level. Starting from
binary and small-group interaction, inequality-generating mechanisms are traced through …