A growing experimental literature studies the endogenous choice of institutions to solve
cooperation problems arising in prisoners' dilemmas, public goods games, and common …

One of the important topics in public choice is how people's free-riding behavior could differ
by group size in collective action dilemmas. This paper experimentally studies how the …

Using samples of both students and workers in China and comparing democratic decision
making (ie being able to choose one's rules) to non-democratic decision making (ie …

Theoretical and empirical studies have generally weighed the effect of peer punishment and
pool punishment for sanctioning free riders separately. However, these sanctioning …

A classic solution to the problem of public goods (PG) is their provision through a strong
state with the power to collect taxes and to mete out penalties for non-compliance. The need …

To promote cooperation, people often rely on the administration of sanctions. However, from
previous research we know that those in control of sanctions are generally reluctant to …

Ostracism is practiced by virtually all societies around the world as a means of enforcing
cooperation. In this paper, we use a public goods experiment to study whether groups …

We study the role of performance differences in a task requiring cognitive effort on in-group
bias. We show that the in-group bias is strong in groups consisting of high-performing …

The provision of public goods motivates the creation of institutions designed to compel
individuals to cooperate. Peer punishment mechanisms have garnered particular attention …

I investigate if, how, and why the effect of a non-deterrent contribution rule in a public goods
game depends on how it is implemented: endogenously chosen or externally imposed. At …