Bayesian persuasion and information design
E Kamenica - Annual Review of Economics, 2019 - annualreviews.org
A school may improve its students' job outcomes if it issues only coarse grades. Google can
reduce congestion on roads by giving drivers noisy information about the state of traffic. A …
reduce congestion on roads by giving drivers noisy information about the state of traffic. A …
Information design: A unified perspective
Given a game with uncertain payoffs, information design analyzes the extent to which the
provision of information alone can influence the behavior of the players. Information design …
provision of information alone can influence the behavior of the players. Information design …
Persuasion of a privately informed receiver
We study persuasion mechanisms in linear environments. A receiver has a private type and
chooses between two actions. A sender designs a persuasion mechanism or an experiment …
chooses between two actions. A sender designs a persuasion mechanism or an experiment …
Persuading voters
In a symmetric information voting model, an individual (politician) can influence voters'
choices by strategically designing a policy experiment (public signal). We characterize the …
choices by strategically designing a policy experiment (public signal). We characterize the …
Extreme points and majorization: Economic applications
We characterize the set of extreme points of monotonic functions that are either majorized by
a given function f or themselves majorize f and show that these extreme points play a crucial …
a given function f or themselves majorize f and show that these extreme points play a crucial …
The simple economics of optimal persuasion
We propose a price-theoretic approach to Bayesian persuasion by establishing an analogy
between the sender's problem and finding Walrasian equilibria of a persuasion economy …
between the sender's problem and finding Walrasian equilibria of a persuasion economy …
Stress tests and information disclosure
We study an optimal disclosure policy of a regulator that has information about banks (eg,
from conducting stress tests). In our model, disclosure can destroy risk-sharing opportunities …
from conducting stress tests). In our model, disclosure can destroy risk-sharing opportunities …
A Rothschild-Stiglitz approach to Bayesian persuasion
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) represent random variables as convex functions (integrals of
the cumulative distribution function). Combining this representation with Blackwell's …
the cumulative distribution function). Combining this representation with Blackwell's …
Impacts of regional water shortage information disclosure on public acceptance of recycled water—evidences from China's urban residents
C Hou, Y Wen, X Liu, M Dong - Journal of Cleaner Production, 2021 - Elsevier
Recycled water is an effective method to rescue regional water shortages and promote
environmental protection. As for end users of recycled water, public attitudes and …
environmental protection. As for end users of recycled water, public attitudes and …
Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors
In a world in which rational individuals may hold different prior beliefs, a sender can
influence the behavior of a receiver by controlling the informativeness of an experiment …
influence the behavior of a receiver by controlling the informativeness of an experiment …