Bayesian persuasion and information design

E Kamenica - Annual Review of Economics, 2019 - annualreviews.org
A school may improve its students' job outcomes if it issues only coarse grades. Google can
reduce congestion on roads by giving drivers noisy information about the state of traffic. A …

Information design: A unified perspective

D Bergemann, S Morris - Journal of Economic Literature, 2019 - aeaweb.org
Given a game with uncertain payoffs, information design analyzes the extent to which the
provision of information alone can influence the behavior of the players. Information design …

Persuasion of a privately informed receiver

A Kolotilin, T Mylovanov, A Zapechelnyuk, M Li - Econometrica, 2017 - Wiley Online Library
We study persuasion mechanisms in linear environments. A receiver has a private type and
chooses between two actions. A sender designs a persuasion mechanism or an experiment …

Persuading voters

R Alonso, O Câmara - American Economic Review, 2016 - aeaweb.org
In a symmetric information voting model, an individual (politician) can influence voters'
choices by strategically designing a policy experiment (public signal). We characterize the …

Extreme points and majorization: Economic applications

A Kleiner, B Moldovanu, P Strack - Econometrica, 2021 - Wiley Online Library
We characterize the set of extreme points of monotonic functions that are either majorized by
a given function f or themselves majorize f and show that these extreme points play a crucial …

The simple economics of optimal persuasion

P Dworczak, G Martini - Journal of Political Economy, 2019 - journals.uchicago.edu
We propose a price-theoretic approach to Bayesian persuasion by establishing an analogy
between the sender's problem and finding Walrasian equilibria of a persuasion economy …

Stress tests and information disclosure

I Goldstein, Y Leitner - Journal of Economic Theory, 2018 - Elsevier
We study an optimal disclosure policy of a regulator that has information about banks (eg,
from conducting stress tests). In our model, disclosure can destroy risk-sharing opportunities …

A Rothschild-Stiglitz approach to Bayesian persuasion

M Gentzkow, E Kamenica - American Economic Review, 2016 - aeaweb.org
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) represent random variables as convex functions (integrals of
the cumulative distribution function). Combining this representation with Blackwell's …

Impacts of regional water shortage information disclosure on public acceptance of recycled water—evidences from China's urban residents

C Hou, Y Wen, X Liu, M Dong - Journal of Cleaner Production, 2021 - Elsevier
Recycled water is an effective method to rescue regional water shortages and promote
environmental protection. As for end users of recycled water, public attitudes and …

Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors

R Alonso, O Câmara - Journal of Economic Theory, 2016 - Elsevier
In a world in which rational individuals may hold different prior beliefs, a sender can
influence the behavior of a receiver by controlling the informativeness of an experiment …