The regulation of entry

S Djankov, R La Porta… - … quarterly Journal of …, 2002 - academic.oup.com
We present new data on the regulation of entry of start-up firms in 85 countries. The data
cover the number of procedures, official time, and official cost that a start-up must bear …

The regulation of labor

JC Botero, S Djankov, RL Porta… - … Quarterly Journal of …, 2004 - academic.oup.com
We investigate the regulation of labor markets through employment, collective relations, and
social security laws in 85 countries. We find that the political power of the left is associated …

The new comparative economics

S Djankov, E Glaeser, R La Porta… - Journal of comparative …, 2003 - Elsevier
In recent years, the field of comparative economics refocused on the comparison of capitalist
economies. The theme of the new research is that institutions exert a profound influence on …

Financial development, property rights, and growth

S Claessens, L Laeven - the Journal of Finance, 2003 - Wiley Online Library
In countries with more secure property rights, firms might allocate resources better and
consequentially grow faster as the returns on different types of assets are more protected …

Law and finance: why does legal origin matter?

T Beck, A Demirgüç-Kunt, R Levine - Journal of comparative economics, 2003 - Elsevier
This paper assesses empirically two theories of why legal origin influences financial
development. The political channel stresses that legal traditions differ in the priority they give …

Competing for capital: The diffusion of bilateral investment treaties, 1960–2000

Z Elkins, AT Guzman, BA Simmons - International organization, 2006 - cambridge.org
Over the past forty-five years, bilateral investment treaties (BITs) have become the most
important international legal mechanism for the encouragement and governance of foreign …

Endogenous political institutions

P Aghion, A Alesina, F Trebbi - The Quarterly Journal of …, 2004 - academic.oup.com
A fundamental aspect of institutional design is how much society chooses to delegate
unchecked power to its leaders. If, once elected, a leader cannot be restrained, society runs …

The injustice of inequality

E Glaeser, J Scheinkman, A Shleifer - Journal of Monetary Economics, 2003 - Elsevier
In many countries, the operation of legal, political and regulatory institutions is subverted by
the wealthy and the politically powerful for their own benefit. This subversion takes the form …

Can the natural resource curse be turned into a blessing? The role of trade policies and institutions

R Arezki, R van der Ploeg - 2007 - papers.ssrn.com
We criticize existing empirical results on the detrimental effects of natural resource
dependence on the rate of economic growth after controlling for institutional quality …

Does more democracy lead to greater economic freedom? New evidence for develo** countries

J De Haan, JE Sturm - European Journal of Political Economy, 2003 - Elsevier
This paper examines the relationship between economic and political freedom, focusing on
develo** countries. We conclude that increases in economic freedom between 1975 and …