[LIBRO][B] What do managers do?: Exploring persistent performance differences among seemingly similar enterprises
R Gibbons, R Henderson - 2012 - Citeseer
Decades of research using a wide variety of detailed plant-and firm-level data has provided
strong evidence of persistent performance differences among seemingly similar enterprises …
strong evidence of persistent performance differences among seemingly similar enterprises …
Conflict and deterrence under strategic risk
S Chassang, GPI Miquel - The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2010 - academic.oup.com
We examine the determinants of cooperation and the effectiveness of deterrence when fear
is a motive for conflict. We contrast results obtained in a complete information setting with …
is a motive for conflict. We contrast results obtained in a complete information setting with …
Fear of miscoordination and the robustness of cooperation in dynamic global games with exit
S Chassang - Econometrica, 2010 - Wiley Online Library
This paper develops a framework to assess how fear of miscoordination affects the
sustainability of cooperation. Building on theoretical insights from Carlsson and van Damme …
sustainability of cooperation. Building on theoretical insights from Carlsson and van Damme …
Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: Characterization and existence
We generalize the results of Hörner and Lovo (2009)[15] to N-player games with arbitrary
information structure. First, we characterize the set of belief-free equilibrium payoffs under …
information structure. First, we characterize the set of belief-free equilibrium payoffs under …
Robust predictions in infinite-horizon games—An unrefinable folk theorem
We show that in any game that is continuous at infinity, if a plan of action ai is played by a
type ti in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, then there are perturbations of ti for which ai is the …
type ti in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, then there are perturbations of ti for which ai is the …
Coordination failure in repeated games with private monitoring
Players coordinate continuation play in repeated games with public monitoring. We
investigate the robustness of such equilibrium behavior with respect to ex-ante small private …
investigate the robustness of such equilibrium behavior with respect to ex-ante small private …
Cooperation under incomplete information on the discount factors
In repeated games, cooperation is possible in equilibrium only if players are sufficiently
patient, and long-term gains from cooperation outweigh short-term gains from deviation …
patient, and long-term gains from cooperation outweigh short-term gains from deviation …
The robust selection of rationalizability
YC Chen, S Takahashi, S ** generations. Our goal is to study the extent to which cooperation can be …