The notion of distortion in social choice problems has been defined to measure the loss in
efficiency--typically measured by the utilitarian social welfare, the sum of utilities of the …

We consider the following well studied problem of metric distortion in social choice. Suppose
we have an election with n voters and m candidates who lie in a shared metric space. We …

Suppose that we have n agents and n items which lie in a shared metric space. We would
like to match the agents to items such that the total distance from agents to their matched …

We consider a social choice setting in which agents and alternatives are represented by
points in a metric space, and the cost of an agent for an alternative is the distance between …

In most social choice settings, the participating agents express their preferences over the
different alternatives in the form of linear orderings. While this clearly simplifies preference …

In this work, we consider general facility location and social choice problems, in which sets
of agents A and facilities F are located in a metric space, and our goal is to assign agents to …

In this work, we study the metric distortion problem in voting theory under a limited amount of
ordinal information. Our primary contribution is threefold. First, we consider mechanisms that …

We consider ordinal approximation algorithms for a broad class of utility maximization
problems for multi-agent systems. In these problems, agents have utilities for connecting to …

We study mechanisms that select members of a set of agents based on nominations by other
members and that are impartial in the sense that agents cannot influence their own chance …

Abstract We consider the One-Sided Matching problem, where n agents have preferences
over n items, and these preferences are induced by underlying cardinal valuation functions …