We study anonymous posted price mechanisms for combinatorial auctions in a Bayesian
framework. In a posted price mechanism, item prices are posted, then the consumers …

Abstract Systems wherein strategic agents compete for limited resources are ubiquitous: the
economy, computer networks, social networks, congestion networks, nature, etc. Assuming …

A number of recent results on optimization problems involving submodular functions have
made use of the multilinear relaxation of the problem. These results hold typically in the …

We provide a computationally efficient black-box reduction from mechanism design to
algorithm design in very general settings. Specifically, we give an approximation-preserving …

This article surveys recent work with an algorithmic flavor in Bayesian mechanism design.
Bayesian mechanism design involves optimization in economic settings where the designer …

We consider the problem of maximizing a monotone submodular function under noise.
Since the 1970s there has been a great deal of work on optimization of submodular …

We study mechanisms for utilitarian combinatorial allocation problems, where agents are not
assumed to be single-minded. This class of problems includes combinatorial auctions, multi …

A longstanding open problem in Algorithmic Mechanism Design is to design computationally-
efficient truthful mechanisms for (approximately) maximizing welfare in combinatorial …

We present a computationally-efficient truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with
subadditive bidders that achieves an O ((loglog m) 3)-approximation to the maximum …

An extensive body of recent work studies the welfare guarantees of simple and prevalent
combinatorial auction formats, such as selling m items via simultaneous second price …