Future cities promise to be more autonomous than ever, largely owing to our ability of
coordinating complex systems in real time: fleets of self-driving cars will offer on-demand …

This survey outlines a general and modular theory for proving approximation guarantees for
equilibria of auctions in complex settings. This theory complements traditional economic …

This text collects the lecture notes from the author's course" Communication Complexity (for
Algorithm Designers)," taught at Stanford in the winter quarter of 2015. The two primary …

This paper develops tools for welfare and revenue analyses of Bayes-Nash equilibria in
asymmetric auctions with single-dimensional agents. We employ these tools to derive price …

We study the following simple Bayesian auction setting: m items are sold to n selfish bidders
in m independent second-price auctions. Each bidder has a private valuation function that …

This paper explains when and how communication and computational lower bounds for
algorithms for an optimization problem translate to lower bounds on the worst-case quality of …

We study two standard multi-unit auction formats for allocating multiple units of a single good
to multi-demand bidders. The first one is the Discriminatory Auction, which charges every …

We study correlated equilibria and coarse equilibria of simple first-price single-item auctions
in the simplest auction model of full information. Nash equilibria are known to always yield …

We expand the literature on the price of anarchy (PoA) of simultaneous item auctions by
considering settings with correlated values; we do this via the fundamental economic model …

We study the communication complexity of welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions
with m items and two players with subadditive valuations. We show that outperforming the …