The assignment of personnel to teams is a fundamental managerial function typically
involving several objectives and a variety of idiosyncratic practical constraints. Despite the …

We evaluate the goal of maximizing the number of individuals matched to acceptable
outcomes. We present two mechanisms that maximize assignments. The first is Pareto …

We extend ratio equilibrium to local public good economies by defining Local Public Good
Equilibrium (LPGE). We employ “share functions” for individual agents that allow easy …

We study hedonic coalition formation problems with friend-oriented preferences; that is,
each agent has preferences over his coalitions based on a partition of the set of agents …

We consider a one-to-one assortative matching problem in which matched pairs compete for
a prize. With externalities, the standard solution concept—pairwise stable matching—may …

We analyze a dynamic game where players can each make offers to other players to form
coalitions. We show that these games have a unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome …

This paper considers a model of centralized college admission under the Boston
mechanism where students may have uncertainty about their priorities. Students have …

This paper presents one-to-one matching and assignment problems with externalities
across pairs. Examples include as pairs figure skating competition and joint ventures in …

arxiv:2204.04251v1 [cs.GT] 8 Apr 2022 Page 1 arxiv:2204.04251v1 [cs.GT] 8 Apr 2022 A
Rotating Proposer Mechanism for Team Formation Jian Lou1, Chen Hajaj2, and Yevgeniy …

This paper presents one-to-one matching and assignment problems with externalities
across pairs such as pairs figure skating competition and joint ventures in oligopolistic …