An allocation rule is “non-bossy” if whenever a change in an agent's preferences does not
bring about a change in his assignment, then it does not bring about a change in anybody's …

We study mechanism design in quasi-linear private values environments when there are two
alternatives. We show that under a mild range condition, every implementable allocation …

We consider direct mechanisms to sell heterogeneous objects when buyers have private
additive valuations and nonunit demand. We completely characterize the class of strategy …

We address the balanced implementation issue for sequencing problems under incomplete
information. For sequencing problems with more than two agents, we identify an important …

This paper characterizes Vickrey auction with reserve price [VARP], in single and multiple
objects settings, using normative and strategic axioms. In particular, it provides a new …

We consider the domain of selfish and continuous preferences over a “rich” allocation space
and show that onto, strategyproof and allocation non-bossy social choice functions are affine …

Collective decision making is an important social issue, since it depends on individual
preferences that are not publicly observable. Therefore, the question is, whether it is …

We study mechanism design when agents may have hidden secondary goals which will
manifest as non-trivial preferences among outcomes for which their primary utility is the …

This paper presents an extension of maxmed mechanisms introduced by Sprumont (J Econ
Theory 148: 1102–1121, 2013) to the multiple homogeneous object setting. To address the …

Our work deals with the important problem of globally characterizing truthful mechanisms
where players have multi-parameter, additive valuations, like scheduling unrelated …