Control-flow integrity: Precision, security, and performance

N Burow, SA Carr, J Nash, P Larsen, M Franz… - ACM Computing …, 2017 - dl.acm.org
Memory corruption errors in C/C++ programs remain the most common source of security
vulnerabilities in today's systems. Control-flow hijacking attacks exploit memory corruption …

A survey on systems security metrics

M Pendleton, R Garcia-Lebron, JH Cho… - ACM Computing Surveys …, 2016 - dl.acm.org
Security metrics have received significant attention. However, they have not been
systematically explored based on the understanding of attack-defense interactions, which …

Data-oriented programming: On the expressiveness of non-control data attacks

H Hu, S Shinde, S Adrian, ZL Chua… - … IEEE Symposium on …, 2016 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
As control-flow hijacking defenses gain adoption, it is important to understand the remaining
capabilities of adversaries via memory exploits. Non-control data exploits are used to mount …

Flip feng shui: Hammering a needle in the software stack

K Razavi, B Gras, E Bosman, B Preneel… - 25th USENIX Security …, 2016 - usenix.org
We introduce Flip Feng Shui (FFS), a new exploitation vector which allows an attacker to
induce bit flips over arbitrary physical memory in a fully controlled way. FFS relies on …

Occlum: Secure and efficient multitasking inside a single enclave of intel sgx

Y Shen, H Tian, Y Chen, K Chen, R Wang… - Proceedings of the …, 2020 - dl.acm.org
Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) enables user-level code to create private memory
regions called enclaves, whose code and data are protected by the CPU from software and …

Everything old is new again: Binary security of {WebAssembly}

D Lehmann, J Kinder, M Pradel - 29th USENIX Security Symposium …, 2020 - usenix.org
WebAssembly is an increasingly popular compilation target designed to run code in
browsers and on other platforms safely and securely, by strictly separating code and data …

Practical context-sensitive CFI

V Van der Veen, D Andriesse, E Göktaş… - Proceedings of the …, 2015 - dl.acm.org
Current Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) implementations track control edges individually,
insensitive to the context of preceding edges. Recent work demonstrates that this leaves …

SoK: Shining light on shadow stacks

N Burow, X Zhang, M Payer - 2019 IEEE Symposium on …, 2019 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
Control-Flow Hijacking attacks are the dominant attack vector against C/C++ programs.
Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) solutions mitigate these attacks on the forward edge, ie, indirect …

Control jujutsu: On the weaknesses of fine-grained control flow integrity

I Evans, F Long, U Otgonbaatar, H Shrobe… - Proceedings of the …, 2015 - dl.acm.org
Control flow integrity (CFI) has been proposed as an approach to defend against control-
hijacking memory corruption attacks. CFI works by assigning tags to indirect branch targets …

Dedup est machina: Memory deduplication as an advanced exploitation vector

E Bosman, K Razavi, H Bos… - 2016 IEEE symposium on …, 2016 - ieeexplore.ieee.org
Memory deduplication, a well-known technique to reduce the memory footprint across virtual
machines, is now also a default-on feature inside the Windows 8.1 and Windows 10 …