This chapter discusses structural econometric approaches to auctions. Remarkably, much of
what can be learned from auction data can be learned without restrictions beyond those …

As the complexities of wireless technologies increase, novel multidisciplinary approaches
for the spectrum sharing/management are required with inputs from the technology …

Auction Theory, Second Edition improves upon his 2002 bestseller with a new chapter on
package and position auctions as well as end-of-chapter questions and chapter notes …

We explore the impact of private information in sealed‐bid first‐price auctions. For a given
symmetric and arbitrarily correlated prior distribution over values, we characterize the lowest …

I examine a model of a uniform price auction of a perfectly divisible good with private
information in which the bidders submit discrete bidpoints rather than continuous downward …

A step toward a strategic foundation for rational expectations equilibrium is taken by
considering a double auction with n buyers and m sellers with interdependent values and …

We generalize Athey's (2001) and McAdams'(2003) results on the existence of monotone
pure‐strategy equilibria in Bayesian games. We allow action spaces to be compact locally …

For the case of two buyers we show that equilibrium in the sealed high-bid auction is unique
when (i) buyers' reservations prices are drawn independently from distributions with finite …

We study a multi-unit auction environment similar to eBay. Sellers, each with a single unit of
a homogeneous good, set reserve prices at their own second-price auctions. Each buyer …

We establish the existence of pure strategy equilibria in monotone bidding functions in first‐
price auctions with asymmetric bidders, interdependent values, and affiliated one …