This review of the theoretical literature on legislative and multilateral bargaining begins with
presentation of the seminal Baron-Ferejohn model. The review then encompasses the …

Is African politics characterized by concentrated power in the hands of a narrow group
(ethnically determined) that then fluctuates from one extreme to another via frequent coups …

Ministerial portfolios are the most obvious payoffs for parties entering a governing coalition
in parliamentary democracies. This renders the bargaining over portfolios an important …

Why do some parties coordinate their electoral strategies as part of a pre-electoral coalition,
while others choose to compete independently at election time? Scholars have long ignored …

DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES are intended to ensure equal representation. Yet the “one
man, one vote” ideal does not mean that everyone benefits equally from political processes …

This paper presents a theory of parliamentary systems with a proportional representation
electoral system, a formateur selected based on party representation in parliament, and …

Although majoritarian decision rules are the norm in legislatures, relatively few democracies
use simple majority rule at the electoral stage, adopting instead some form of multiparty …

In this paper we estimate a bargaining model of government formation in parliamentary
democracies. We use the estimated structural model to conduct constitutional experiments …

In this paper we consider a dynamic model of government formation in parliamentary
democracies that accounts for the following phenomena:(1) minority and surplus …

Over the last two decades a large and important literature has emerged that uses game
theoretic models of bargaining to study legislative coalitions. To test key predictions of these …