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A new combinatorial branch-and-bound algorithm for the knapsack problem with conflicts
Abstract We study the Knapsack Problem with Conflicts, a generalization of the Knapsack
Problem in which a set of conflicts specifies pairs of items which cannot be simultaneously …
Problem in which a set of conflicts specifies pairs of items which cannot be simultaneously …
Can reinforcement learning find stackelberg-nash equilibria in general-sum markov games with myopic followers?
We study multi-player general-sum Markov games with one of the players designated as the
leader and the other players regarded as followers. In particular, we focus on the class of …
leader and the other players regarded as followers. In particular, we focus on the class of …
Position: social environment design should be further developed for AI-based policy-making
Artificial Intelligence (AI) holds promise as a technology that can be used to improve
government and economic policy-making. This paper proposes a new research agenda …
government and economic policy-making. This paper proposes a new research agenda …
Coordinating followers to reach better equilibria: End-to-end gradient descent for stackelberg games
A growing body of work in game theory extends the traditional Stackelberg game to settings
with one leader and multiple followers who play a Nash equilibrium. Standard approaches …
with one leader and multiple followers who play a Nash equilibrium. Standard approaches …
Can reinforcement learning find Stackelberg-Nash equilibria in general-sum Markov games with myopically rational followers?
We study multi-player general-sum Markov games with one of the players designated as the
leader and the other players regarded as followers. In particular, we focus on the class of …
leader and the other players regarded as followers. In particular, we focus on the class of …
Multi-Sender Persuasion: A Computational Perspective
We consider the multi-sender persuasion problem: multiple players with informational
advantage signal to convince a single self-interested actor to take certain actions. This …
advantage signal to convince a single self-interested actor to take certain actions. This …
Computing a pessimistic stackelberg equilibrium with multiple followers: The mixed-pure case
The search problem of computing a Stackelberg (or leader-follower) equilibrium (also
referred to as an optimal strategy to commit to) has been widely investigated in the scientific …
referred to as an optimal strategy to commit to) has been widely investigated in the scientific …
Bilevel programming methods for computing single-leader-multi-follower equilibria in normal-form and polymatrix games
The concept of leader-follower (or Stackelberg) equilibrium plays a central role in a number
of real-world applications bordering on mathematical optimization and game theory. While …
of real-world applications bordering on mathematical optimization and game theory. While …
A unified framework for multistage mixed integer linear optimization
We introduce a unified framework for the study of multilevel mixed integer linear optimization
problems and multistage stochastic mixed integer linear optimization problems with …
problems and multistage stochastic mixed integer linear optimization problems with …
Bilevel programming approaches to the computation of optimistic and pessimistic single-leader-multi-follower equilibria
We study the problem of computing an equilibrium in leader-follower games with a single
leader and multiple followers where, after the leader's commitment to a mixed strategy, the …
leader and multiple followers where, after the leader's commitment to a mixed strategy, the …