Bayesian persuasion studies how an informed sender should influence beliefs of rational
receivers that take decisions through Bayesian updating of a common prior. We focus on the …

We study a repeated information design problem faced by an informed sender who tries to
influence the behavior of a self-interested receiver. We consider settings where the receiver …

Bayesian persuasion studies how an informed sender should partially disclose information
to influence the behavior of a self-interested receiver. Classical models make the stringent …

We study a dynamic model of Bayesian persuasion in sequential decision-making settings.
An informed principal observes an external parameter of the world and advises an …

We study a repeated persuasion setting between a sender and a receiver, where at each
time t, the sender shares information about a payoff-relevant state with the receiver. The …

This work considers a repeated principal-agent bandit game, where the principal can only
interact with her environment through the agent. The principal and the agent have …

We revisit the celebrated Bayesian persuasion setting and examine how well the Sender
can perform when ignorant of the Receiver's utility. Taking an adversarial approach, we …

Bilateral trade models the problem of intermediating between two rational agents—a seller
and a buyer—both characterized by a private valuation for an item they want to trade. We …

In Bayesian persuasion, an informed sender strategically discloses information to a receiver
so as to persuade them to undertake desirable actions. Recently, a growing attention has …

Network congestion games are a well-understood model of multi-agent strategic
interactions. Despite their ubiquitous applications, it is not clear whether it is possible to …