Abstract Direct Social Perception (DSP) is the idea that we can non-inferentially perceive
others' mental states. In this paper, I argue that the standard way of framing DSP leaves the …

There is an underlying assumption in the social sciences that consciousness and social life
are ultimately classical physical/material phenomena. In this ground-breaking book …

Quite a number of the philosophical arguments and objections currently being launched
against simulation (ST) based and theory-theory (TT) based approaches to mindreading …

Much recent work on social cognition and empathy in philosophy of mind and cognitive
science has been guided by the assumption that minds are composed of intracranial …

I propose a distinction between two closely related problems: the problem of social cognition
and the problem of participatory sense-making. One problem focuses on how we …

I clarify recently developed phenomenological approaches to social cognition. These are
approaches that, drawing on developmental science, social neuroscience, and dynamic …

In this paper we sketch the outlines of an account of the kind of social cognition involved in
simple action coordination that is based on direct social perception (DSP) rather than …

The problem of other minds has a distinguished philosophical history stretching back more
than two hundred years. Taken at face value, it is an epistemological question: it concerns …

Defenders of a direct perception approach to other minds-what I'll here refer to as direct
social perception (DSP)—argue that we directly perceive mental states. ¹ I see my partner's …

This chapter aims to show that the phenomenological tradition harbours an elaborate
conceptual framework for thematising empathy, one which remains relevant for …