The price of anarchy in auctions
This survey outlines a general and modular theory for proving approximation guarantees for
equilibria of auctions in complex settings. This theory complements traditional economic …
equilibria of auctions in complex settings. This theory complements traditional economic …
Putting renewable energy auctions into action–An agent-based model of onshore wind power auctions in Germany
V Anatolitis, M Welisch - Energy Policy, 2017 - Elsevier
The following analysis looks into auctions for renewable energy, specifically onshore wind
power in Germany. Following an agent-based modeling approach, the two most commonly …
power in Germany. Following an agent-based modeling approach, the two most commonly …
No-regret learning in Bayesian games
Recent price-of-anarchy analyses of games of complete information suggest that coarse
correlated equilibria, which characterize outcomes resulting from no-regret learning …
correlated equilibria, which characterize outcomes resulting from no-regret learning …
Learning in auctions: Regret is hard, envy is easy
An extensive body of recent work studies the welfare guarantees of simple and prevalent
combinatorial auction formats, such as selling m items via simultaneous second price …
combinatorial auction formats, such as selling m items via simultaneous second price …
Price of anarchy for greedy auctions
We study mechanisms for utilitarian combinatorial allocation problems, where agents are not
assumed to be single-minded. This class of problems includes combinatorial auctions, multi …
assumed to be single-minded. This class of problems includes combinatorial auctions, multi …
The price of anarchy in large games
We present an analysis framework for bounding the price of anarchy (POA) in games that
have many players, as in many of the games most pertinent to computer science …
have many players, as in many of the games most pertinent to computer science …
On the efficiency of the walrasian mechanism
Central results in economics guarantee the existence of efficient equilibria for various
classes of markets. An underlying assumption in early work is that agents are price-takers …
classes of markets. An underlying assumption in early work is that agents are price-takers …
Bayesian combinatorial auctions
We study the following simple Bayesian auction setting: m items are sold to n selfish bidders
in m independent second-price auctions. Each bidder has a private valuation function that …
in m independent second-price auctions. Each bidder has a private valuation function that …
Tight bounds for the price of anarchy of simultaneous first-price auctions
We study the price of anarchy (PoA) of simultaneous first-price auctions (FPAs) for buyers
with submodular and subadditive valuations. The current best upper bounds for the …
with submodular and subadditive valuations. The current best upper bounds for the …
Learning in Repeated Multiunit Pay-as-Bid Auctions
Problem definition: Motivated by carbon emissions trading schemes (ETSs), Treasury
auctions, procurement auctions, and wholesale electricity markets, which all involve the …
auctions, procurement auctions, and wholesale electricity markets, which all involve the …