We consider the problem of distributing the proceeds generated from a joint venture in which
the participating agents are hierarchically organized. We introduce and characterize a family …

A comprehensive overview of networks and economic design, presenting models and
results drawn from economics, operations research, and computer science; with examples …

Users share the cost of unreliable non-rival projects (items). For instance, industry partners
pay today for R&D that may or may not deliver a cure to some viruses, agents pay for the …

We study mechanisms for environments in which only some of the agents are directly
connected to a mechanism designer and the other agents can participate in a mechanism …

In this paper two cost sharing solutions for minimum cost spanning tree problems are
introduced, the degree adjusted folk solution and the cost adjusted folk solution. These …

Consider a sequential process where agents have individual values at every possible step.
A planner is in charge of selecting steps and distributing the accumulated aggregate values …

Agents are endowed with time, which in turn is invested in projects that generate profit. A
mechanism divides the profit generated by these agents depending on the allocation of time …

We provide a framework for the study of the allocation of a divisible resource from a planner
to agents via intermediaries. Intermediaries simultaneously post fees for their services, and …

A traditional non-cooperative bargaining situation involves two or more forward-looking
players making offers and counteroffers alternately until an agreement is reached, with a …

This paper considers cost allocation in networks where agents are characterized by
stochastic demand and supply of a non-storable good, eg green energy. The grid itself …