Cross-cultural variation in cooperation: A meta-analysis.

G Spadaro, C Graf, S **, S Arai, Y Inoue… - Journal of Personality …, 2022 - psycnet.apa.org
Impersonal cooperation among strangers enables societies to create valuable public goods,
such as infrastructure, public services, and democracy. Several factors have been proposed …

Revisiting situational strength: Do strong situations restrict variance in behaviors?

R Li, D Balliet, I Thielmann… - Journal of Personality and …, 2024 - psycnet.apa.org
The idea that strong situations restrict variance in behaviors has been treated as a maxim in
psychology. Prior work has, however, offered inconclusive support for this proposition. We …

Conditional cooperator enhances institutional punishment in public goods game

B Zhang, X An, Y Dong - Applied Mathematics and Computation, 2021 - Elsevier
The role of incentive institutions on promoting cooperation in public goods game (PGG) has
attracted much attention. Theoretical studies based on Nash equilibrium analysis predict that …

Punishing second-order free riders before first-order free riders: The effect of pool punishment priority on cooperation

H Ozono, Y Kamijo, K Shimizu - Scientific reports, 2017 - nature.com
Second-order free riders, who do not owe punishment cost to first-order free riders in public
goods games, lead to low cooperation. Previous studies suggest that for stable cooperation …

Do people prefer leaders who enforce norms? Reputational effects of reward and punishment decisions in noisy social dilemmas

EW de Kwaadsteniet, T Kiyonari… - Journal of Experimental …, 2019 - Elsevier
The present paper investigates how rewards as well as punishments–implemented to
enforce the social norm of cooperation–impact the reputations of the leaders administering …

Cooperation in groups of different sizes: the effects of punishment and reputation-based partner choice

J Wu, D Balliet, LS Peperkoorn, A Romano… - Frontiers in …, 2020 - frontiersin.org
Reputation and punishment are two distinct mechanisms that facilitate cooperation among
strangers. However, empirical research on their effectiveness is mainly limited to relatively …

Pool punishment in public goods games: How do sanctioners' incentives affect us?

A Alventosa, A Antonioni, P Hernández - Journal of Economic Behavior & …, 2021 - Elsevier
Centralized sanctioning in social dilemmas has been shown to increase efficiency with
respect to standard decentralized peer punishment. In this context, we explore the impact of …

Game theory and the evolution of cooperation

BY Zhang, S Pei - Journal of the Operations Research Society of China, 2022 - Springer
Evolution is based on the competition between individuals and therefore rewards only
selfish behavior. How cooperation or altruism behavior could prevail in social dilemma then …

The force of norms? The internal point of view in light of experimental economics

L Hoeft - Ratio Juris, 2019 - Wiley Online Library
Abstract Setting aside its conceptual issues, it remains an open question whether the
internal point of view is a good descriptive tool for the behaviour of ordinary citizens or if a …

Endowment heterogeneity, incomplete information & institutional choice in public good experiments

LR De Geest, DC Kingsley - Journal of Behavioral and Experimental …, 2019 - Elsevier
We study centralized and decentralized enforcement in social dilemmas with income
inequality and incomplete information. Subjects are randomly assigned different …