Standard political economy models of redistribution, notably that of Meltzer and Richard
(1981), fail to account for the remarkable variance in government redistribution across …

This review of the theoretical literature on legislative and multilateral bargaining begins with
presentation of the seminal Baron-Ferejohn model. The review then encompasses the …

We study the effects of electoral institutions on the size and composition of public
expenditure in OECD and Latin American countries. We emphasize the distinction between …

Research on government formation in parliamentary democracies is replete with theoretical
arguments about why some coalitions form while others do not. Unfortunately, this …

Der bundesdeutsche Parteienwettbewerb hat sich in den letzten Jahren und damit seit der
Veröffentlichung der ersten Auflage dieses Buches im Herbst 2011 stark verändert. So führte …

This work develops and tests a theory of voter choice in parliamentary elections. I
demonstrate that voters are concerned with policy outcomes and hence incorporate the way …

We present a theoretical model of a parliamentary democracy where electoral competition
inside coalition governments induces higher spending than under single party governments …

Many employment relationships concede rents to workers. Depending on the political
institutions, the presence of such rents allows employers to use the threat of withdrawing …

In parliamentary democracies, governments are typically composed of multiple political
parties working together in a coalition. Such governments must confront a fundamental …

We examine the stability of individual ministers across parliamentary democracies. Our data
show that this stability is only loosely related to the stability of cabinets, making it impossible …