[BOK][B] Einführung in die Spieltheorie

MJ Holler, G Illing, S Napel - 1991 - Springer
Wir haben die Möglichkeit einer weiteren Auflage des Buches genutzt, den Text
leserfreundlicher zu gestalten, den Sach-und Personenindex zu überarbeiten und neuere …

A recursive measure of voting power with partial decisiveness or efficacy

A Abizadeh - The Journal of Politics, 2022 - journals.uchicago.edu
The current literature standardly conceives of voting power in terms of decisiveness: the
ability to change the voting outcome by unilaterally changing one's vote. I argue that this …

Influence in weighted committees

S Kurz, A Mayer, S Napel - European Economic Review, 2021 - Elsevier
Committee decisions on more than two alternatives much depend on the adopted
aggregation rule, and so does the distribution of power among committee members. We …

Weighted committee games

S Kurz, A Mayer, S Napel - European Journal of Operational Research, 2020 - Elsevier
Many binary collective choice situations can be described as weighted simple voting games.
We introduce weighted committee games to model decisions on an arbitrary number of …

Measuring the difficulties in forming a coalition government

T Hiller - Games, 2023 - mdpi.com
Electoral thresholds in the context of parliamentary elections are an instrument for
preventing the fragmentation of parliaments and facilitate the formation of a coalition …

A mathematical analysis of an election system proposed by Gottlob Frege

P Harrenstein, ML Lackner, M Lackner - Erkenntnis, 2020 - Springer
In 1998 a long-lost proposal for an election law by Gottlob Frege (1848–1925) was
rediscovered in the Thüringer Universitäts-und Landesbibliothek in Jena, Germany. The …

[BOK][B] An economic analysis of public law: demos and agora

G Dellis - 2021 - books.google.com
This original and insightful book considers the ways in which public law, which emphasises
legality (the Demos), and economics, a science oriented towards the markets (the Agora) …

Luxembourg in the early days of the EEC: null player or not?

A Mayer - Games, 2018 - mdpi.com
Voters whose yes-or-no decision never makes a difference to the outcome in a simple voting
game are known as “null players”. Luxembourg's role in the Council of Ministers during the …

Weighted simple games and the topology of simplicial complexes

A Brooks, F Sarcevic, I Volic - arxiv preprint arxiv:2210.09771, 2022 - arxiv.org
We use simplicial complexes to model weighted voting games where certain coalitions are
considered unlikely or impossible. Expressions for Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik power …

The roll call interpretation of the Shapley value

S Kurz, S Napel - Economics Letters, 2018 - Elsevier
The Shapley value is commonly illustrated by roll call votes in which players support or
reject a proposal in sequence. If all sequences are equiprobable, a voter's Shapley value …