Quality risk in logistics outsourcing: A fourth party logistics perspective
We investigate an outsourcing logistics risk management problem under a principal-agency
framework. A fourth-party logistics firm (4PL) deputes a third-party logistics firm (3PL) to …
framework. A fourth-party logistics firm (4PL) deputes a third-party logistics firm (3PL) to …
[HTML][HTML] Optimal dynamic incentive mechanism design for construction and demolition waste recycling with Bayesian learning
R Tan, Y Wu, P Su, R Liao, J Zhang - Journal of Cleaner Production, 2023 - Elsevier
A lack of a steady supply of high-quality construction and demolition (C&D) waste hinders
the development of the recycling industry, and information asymmetry makes it difficult for a …
the development of the recycling industry, and information asymmetry makes it difficult for a …
Dynamic regulation on innovation and adoption of green technology with information asymmetry
L Rong, J Chen, Z Wen - Naval Research Logistics (NRL), 2022 - Wiley Online Library
This study investigates a regulator's dynamic policy to motivate firms' research on and
adoption of green technology. In the proposed model, a firm makes unobservable efforts and …
adoption of green technology. In the proposed model, a firm makes unobservable efforts and …
Optimal monitoring schedule in dynamic contracts
Consider a setting in which a principal induces effort from an agent to reduce the arrival rate
of a Poisson process of adverse events. The effort is costly to the agent and unobservable to …
of a Poisson process of adverse events. The effort is costly to the agent and unobservable to …
Optimal incentive contracts in project management
Motivated by the ever‐growing complexity of projects and the consistent trend of outsourcing
of individual tasks or components, we study the contract‐design problem faced by a firm (or …
of individual tasks or components, we study the contract‐design problem faced by a firm (or …
Incentive mechanism and subsidy design for construction and demolition waste recycling under information asymmetry with reciprocal behaviors
P Su, Y Peng, Q Hu, R Tan - … journal of environmental research and public …, 2020 - mdpi.com
To solve information asymmetry, we adopted the principal-agent framework to design the
incentive mechanisms between the remanufacturer and the collector in the construction and …
incentive mechanisms between the remanufacturer and the collector in the construction and …
Pricing strategy for co-created products in platform-based consumer innovation
S Zhu, S Du, T Nie, Y Zhu - Electronic Commerce Research and …, 2024 - Elsevier
Consumer innovation, which is the participation of consumers (or users) in product research
and development, has become increasingly popular in recent years. Simultaneously, large …
and development, has become increasingly popular in recent years. Simultaneously, large …
Optimal contract for machine repair and maintenance
A principal hires an agent to repair a machine when it is down and maintain it when it is up
and earns a revenue flow when the machine is up. Both the up-and downtimes follow …
and earns a revenue flow when the machine is up. Both the up-and downtimes follow …
[HTML][HTML] In search of a unicorn: Dynamic agency with endogenous investment opportunities
We study the optimal dynamic contract that provides incentives for an agent (eg, SPAC
sponsor, VC general partner, CTO) to exploit investment opportunities/targets that arrive …
sponsor, VC general partner, CTO) to exploit investment opportunities/targets that arrive …
The when and how of delegated search
Firms often outsource search processes, such as the acquisition of real estate, new
technologies, or talent. To ensure the efficacy of such delegated search, firms need to …
technologies, or talent. To ensure the efficacy of such delegated search, firms need to …