The choice of an auction mechanism influences which object characteristics bidders learn
about and whether the object is allocated efficiently. Some object characteristics are valued …

We explore a model of duopolistic competition in which consumers learn about the fit of
each competitor's product. In equilibrium, consumers comparison shop: they learn only …

This review discusses the seminal contributions of Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al.(1983)
Milgrom and Weber (1982a) to the literature that studies the role of information in auctions …

Over the last two decades, auctions have become an integral part of e-commerce and a
promising field for applying artificial intelligence technologies. The use of signals has been …

This paper examines the welfare implications of third-party informational intermediation. A
seller sets the price of a product that is sold through an informational intermediary. The …

We study a common-value auction in which a large number of identical, indivisible objects
are sold to a large number of ex-ante identical bidders with unit demand. Bidders are initially …

Auction of agro-product between buyers and a farmer deals with first-price auctions in the
situation of the cobweb model of supply and demand. The first price bidding auction lies in …

We consider auctions where buyers can acquire costly information about their valuations
and those of others, and investigate how competition between buyers shapes their learning …

This paper examines the welfare effects of informational intermediation. A (shortlived) seller
sets the price of a product that is sold through a (long-lived) informational intermediary. The …

We examine a setting of independent private value auctions where bidders can covertly
acquire gradual information about their valuations. We demonstrate that a dynamic pivot …