Memory corruption errors in C/C++ programs remain the most common source of security
vulnerabilities in today's systems. Control-flow hijacking attacks exploit memory corruption …

Security metrics have received significant attention. However, they have not been
systematically explored based on the understanding of attack-defense interactions, which …

In this chapter, we describe code-pointer integrity (CPI), a new design point that guarantees
the integrity of all code pointers in a program (eg, function pointers, saved return addresses) …

As control-flow hijacking defenses gain adoption, it is important to understand the remaining
capabilities of adversaries via memory exploits. Non-control data exploits are used to mount …

Despite decades of sustained effort, memory corruption attacks continue to be one of the
most serious security threats faced today. They are highly sought after by attackers, as they …

WebAssembly is an increasingly popular compilation target designed to run code in
browsers and on other platforms safely and securely, by strictly separating code and data …

Control-Flow Hijacking attacks are the dominant attack vector against C/C++ programs.
Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) solutions mitigate these attacks on the forward edge, ie, indirect …

System software commonly uses indirect calls to realize dynamic program behaviors.
However, indirect-calls also bring challenges to constructing a precise control-flow graph …

With the widespread deployment of Control-Flow Integrity (CFI), control-flow hijacking
attacks, and consequently code reuse attacks, are significantly more difficult. CFI limits …

The goal of control-flow integrity (CFI) is to stop control-hijacking attacks by ensuring that
each indirect control-flow transfer (ICT) jumps to its legitimate target. However, existing …