We introduce a simple model of dynamic matching in networked markets, where agents
arrive and depart stochastically and the composition of the trade network depends …

Most algorithmic matches in fielded kidney exchanges do not result in an actual transplant.
In this paper, we address the problem of cycles and chains in a proposed match failing after …

Many patients in need of a kidney transplant have a willing but incompatible (or poorly
matched) living donor. Kidney exchange programs arrange exchanges among such patient …

A kidney exchange is an organized barter market where patients in need of a kidney swap
willing but incompatible donors. Determining an optimal set of exchanges is theoretically …

In recent decades, healthcare providers have faced mounting pressure to effectively
manage highly perishable and limited medical resources. This article offers a …

In this paper, we present a construction of amatching sparsifier', that is, a sparse subgraph of
the given graph that preserves large matchings approximately and is robust to modifications …

Motivated by an application in kidney exchange, we study the following stochastic matching
problem: We are given a graph G (V, E)(not necessarily bipartite), where each edge in E is …

We consider the maximum bipartite matching problem in stochastic settings, namely the
query-commit and price-of-information models. In the query-commit model, an edge e …

We introduce a novel adversarial model for scheduling with explorable uncertainty. In this
model, the processing time of a job can potentially be reduced (by an a priori unknown …

Many kidney exchange programs (KEPs) use integer linear programming (ILP) based on a
hierarchical set of objectives to determine optimal sets of transplants. We propose innovative …