Potential Games Are Necessary to Ensure Pure Nash Equilibria in Cost Sharing Games
We consider the problem of designing distribution rules to share “welfare”(cost or revenue)
among individually strategic agents. There are many known distribution rules that guarantee …
among individually strategic agents. There are many known distribution rules that guarantee …
The performance of deferred-acceptance auctions
Deferred-acceptance auctions are auctions for binary single-parameter mechanism design
problems whose allocation rule can be implemented using an adaptive reverse greedy …
problems whose allocation rule can be implemented using an adaptive reverse greedy …
Deferred-acceptance auctions for multiple levels of service
Deferred-acceptance (DA) auctions} are mechanisms that are based on backward-greedy
algorithms and possess a number of remarkable incentive properties, including …
algorithms and possess a number of remarkable incentive properties, including …
On Proportionate and Truthful International Alliance Contributions: An Analysis of Incentive Compatible Cost Sharing Mechanisms to Burden Sharing
WN Caballero - 2017 - scholar.afit.edu
Burden sharing within an international alliance is a contentious topic, especially in the
current geopolitical environment, that in practice is generally imposed by a central authority's …
current geopolitical environment, that in practice is generally imposed by a central authority's …