[BOOK][B] Computational aspects of cooperative game theory

G Chalkiadakis, E Elkind, M Wooldridge - 2011 - books.google.com
Cooperative game theory is a branch of (micro-) economics that studies the behavior of self-
interested agents in strategic settings where binding agreements among agents are …

Distributed heuristic forward search for multi-agent planning

R Nissim, R Brafman - Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 2014 - jair.org
This paper deals with the problem of classical planning for multiple cooperative agents who
have private information about their local state and capabilities they do not want to reveal …

Scaling up multiagent planning: A best-response approach

A Jonsson, M Rovatsos - … of the International Conference on Automated …, 2011 - ojs.aaai.org
Multiagent planning is computationally hard in the general case due to the exponential
blowup in the action space induced by concurrent action of different agents. At the same …

On the complexity of planning for agent teams and its implications for single agent planning

RI Brafman, C Domshlak - Artificial Intelligence, 2013 - Elsevier
If the complexity of planning for a single agent is described by some function f of the input,
how much more difficult is it to plan for a team of n cooperating agents? If these agents are …

[HTML][HTML] Characteristic function games with restricted agent interactions: Core-stability and coalition structures

G Chalkiadakis, G Greco, E Markakis - Artificial Intelligence, 2016 - Elsevier
In many real-world settings, the structure of the environment constrains the formation of
coalitions among agents. These settings can be represented by characteristic function …

[PDF][PDF] On the complexity of the core over coalition structures

G Greco, E Malizia, L Palopoli, F Scarcello - Twenty-Second International …, 2011 - ijcai.org
The computational complexity of relevant corerelated questions for coalitional games is
addressed from the coalition structure viewpoint, ie, without assuming that the grand …

Cost-optimal planning by self-interested agents

R Nissim, R Brafman - Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial …, 2013 - ojs.aaai.org
As our world becomes better connected and autonomous agents no longer appear to be
science fiction, a natural need arises for enabling groups of selfish agents to cooperate in …

[HTML][HTML] Complexity results for preference aggregation over (m) CP-nets: Pareto and majority voting

T Lukasiewicz, E Malizia - Artificial Intelligence, 2019 - Elsevier
Aggregating preferences over combinatorial domains has many applications in artificial
intelligence (AI). Given the inherent exponential nature of preferences over combinatorial …

[PDF][PDF] Coalitional stability in structured environments

G Chalkiadakis, V Markakis, N Jennings - 2012 - eprints.soton.ac.uk
In many real-world settings, the structure of the environment constrains the formation of
coalitions among agents. Therefore, examining the stability of formed coalition structures in …

[HTML][HTML] Cooperative games with overlap** coalitions: Charting the tractability frontier

Y Zick, G Chalkiadakis, E Elkind, E Markakis - Artificial Intelligence, 2019 - Elsevier
The framework of cooperative games with overlap** coalitions (OCF games), which was
proposed by Chalkiadakis et al.[1], generalizes classic cooperative games to settings where …