Fair allocation of indivisible goods to asymmetric agents
We study fair allocation of indivisible goods to agents with unequal entitlements. Fair
allocation has been the subject of many studies in both divisible and indivisible settings. Our …
allocation has been the subject of many studies in both divisible and indivisible settings. Our …
On existence of truthful fair cake cutting mechanisms
B Tao - Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on …, 2022 - dl.acm.org
We study the fair division problem on divisible heterogeneous resources (the cake cutting
problem) with strategic agents, where each agent can manipulate his/her private valuation in …
problem) with strategic agents, where each agent can manipulate his/her private valuation in …
Contiguous cake cutting: Hardness results and approximation algorithms
We study the fair allocation of a cake, which serves as a metaphor for a divisible resource,
under the requirement that each agent should receive a contiguous piece of the cake. While …
under the requirement that each agent should receive a contiguous piece of the cake. While …
[HTML][HTML] Mind the gap: Cake cutting with separation
We study the problem of fairly allocating a divisible resource, also known as cake cutting,
with an additional requirement that the shares that different agents receive should be …
with an additional requirement that the shares that different agents receive should be …
Fair allocation of indivisible goods: Improvement
We study the problem of fair allocation for indivisible goods. We use the maximin share
paradigm introduced by Budish [Budish E (2011) The combinatorial assignment problem …
paradigm introduced by Budish [Budish E (2011) The combinatorial assignment problem …
Truthful fair division without free disposal
We study the problem of fairly dividing a heterogeneous resource, commonly known as cake
cutting and chore division, in the presence of strategic agents. While a number of results in …
cutting and chore division, in the presence of strategic agents. While a number of results in …
Two's company, three's a crowd: Consensus-halving for a constant number of agents
We consider the ε-Consensus-Halving problem, in which a set of heterogeneous agents aim
at dividing a continuous resource into two (not necessarily contiguous) portions that all of …
at dividing a continuous resource into two (not necessarily contiguous) portions that all of …
Obvious manipulations in cake-cutting
In the classical cake-cutting problem, strategy-proofness is a very costly requirement in
terms of fairness: for n= 2 it implies a dictatorial allocation, whereas for n≥ 3 it implies that …
terms of fairness: for n= 2 it implies a dictatorial allocation, whereas for n≥ 3 it implies that …
[PDF][PDF] Fair division with minimal sharing
A set of objects, some goods and some bads, is to be divided fairly among agents with
different tastes, modeled by additive utility-functions. If the objects cannot be shared, so that …
different tastes, modeled by additive utility-functions. If the objects cannot be shared, so that …
Graphical cake cutting via maximin share
We study the recently introduced cake-cutting setting in which the cake is represented by an
undirected graph. This generalizes the canonical interval cake and allows for modeling the …
undirected graph. This generalizes the canonical interval cake and allows for modeling the …