We illustrate the corrosive effect of even small amounts of adverse selection in an asset
market and show how it can lead to the total breakdown of trade. The problem is the failure …

This paper analyses information acquisition in ultimatum bargaining with common values.
Because of an endogenous lemons problem the equilibrium payoffs of the agents are non …

We discuss the economics literature relevant to the design of centralized two-sided market
mechanisms for environments in which both buyers and sellers have private information …

We consider a war of attrition where the players can learn about a state that determines their
payoffs at stochastic deadline. We study how the incentives to acquire information depend …

This paper analyzes endogenous information provision and purchase in over-the-counter
(OTC) markets. On the supply side the optimal strategy of an information provider consists of …

Two ex ante identically informed agents play an alternating offer bargaining game with
endogenous information acquisition and common values. This paper shows that perfect …

The paper introduces the assumption of costly information acquisition to the theory of
mechanism design for matching allocation problems. It is shown that the assumption of …

This paper analyzes the market for financial information and the incentive of institutions,
such as Reuters, to provide information to traders in decentralized financial markets. We …