The global financial crisis, the EMU sovereign debt crisis and international financial regulation: lessons from a systematic literature review

S Meier, MR Gonzalez, F Kunze - International Review of Law and …, 2021 - Elsevier
To ensure the safety and soundness of the global financial system as well as individual
financial institutions and to reduce systemic risk, numerous policy measures and regulatory …

Debt holder monitoring and implicit guarantees: did the BRRD improve market discipline?

JA Cutura - Journal of Financial Stability, 2021 - Elsevier
This paper argues that the European Union's Banking Recovery and Resolution Directive
(BRRD) has improved market discipline in the European bank market for unsecured debt …

Europe's Banking Union at Ten Unfinished yet Transformative

N Véron - Peterson Institute for International Economics Working …, 2024 - papers.ssrn.com
Europe's banking union, the project to pool responsibility for prudential policy at the
European Union level, became a reality in 2014 with the empowerment of the European …

Bank capital and the European recovery from the COVID-19 crisis

M Schularick, S Steffen, T Tröger - 2020 - econstor.eu
Do current levels of bank capital in Europe suffice to support a swift recovery from the COVID-
19 crisis? Recent research shows that a well-capitalized banking sector is a major factor …

Bank bail-in between liquidity and solvency

WG Ringe - Am. Bankr. LJ, 2018 - HeinOnline
During the recent global financial crisis, the phrase" too big to fail" surfaced as a description
of financial institutions that are so large and so interconnected with other financial …

Why MREL won't help much: minimum requirements for bail-in capital as an insufficient remedy for defunct private sector involvement under the European bank …

TH Tröger - Journal of banking regulation, 2020 - Springer
The bail-in tool as implemented in the European bank resolution framework suffers from
severe shortcomings. To some extent, the regulatory framework can remove the …

Limiting too-big-to-fail: market reactions to policy announcements and actions

M Bellia, S Maccaferri, S Schich - Journal of Banking Regulation, 2022 - Springer
Banks considered too-big-to-fail (TBTF) tend to benefit from funding cost advantages as their
debt is considered implicitly guaranteed by public authorities, even if the latter have …

How do bail-in amendments in Directive (EU) 2017/2399 affect the subordinated bond yields of EU G-SIBs?

G Velliscig, J Floreani, M Polato - Journal of Empirical Finance, 2022 - Elsevier
Using a diff-in-diff analysis, we compare the yield reaction of subordinated bonds to the
implementation of the Directive (EU) 2017/2399, for EU G-SIBs and smaller banks. We find …

The bail-in beyond unpredictability: Creditors' incentives and market discipline

E Martino - European Business Organization Law Review, 2020 - Springer
The market discipline of creditors on the risk-taking behaviour of borrowing banks
represents a long-lasting debate. Such a debate gained new attention after the post-crisis …

10 years of Banking Union Case-Law: How Did CJEU Judgments Shape Supervision and Resolution Practice in the Banking Union?

C Gortsos - 2024 - papers.ssrn.com
This study analyses in a systematic way (albeit on a selective basis) the evolution of the
case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in relation to the two pillars of …