Optimal persuasion via bi‐pooling

I Arieli, Y Babichenko, R Smorodinsky… - Theoretical …, 2023 - Wiley Online Library
Mean‐preserving contractions are critical for studying Bayesian models of information
design. We introduce the class of bi‐pooling policies, and the class of bi‐pooling …

Optimal quality certification

A Zapechelnyuk - American Economic Review: Insights, 2020 - aeaweb.org
Quality certification not only informs consumers but also stimulates producers to supply
better-quality products. We study a problem of quality certification in a moral hazard setting …

Monotone function intervals: Theory and applications

KH Yang, AK Zentefis - American Economic Review, 2024 - aeaweb.org
A monotone function interval is the set of monotone functions that lie pointwise between two
fixed,-monotone functions. We characterize the set of extreme points of monotone function …

Optimal information disclosure in classic auctions

D Bergemann, T Heumann, S Morris… - American Economic …, 2022 - aeaweb.org
We characterize the revenue-maximizing information structure in the second-price auction.
The seller faces a trade-off: more information improves the efficiency of the allocation but …

The economics of partisan gerrymandering

A Kolotilin, A Wolitzky - arxiv preprint arxiv:2304.09381, 2023 - arxiv.org
We study the problem of a partisan gerrymanderer who assigns voters to equipopulous
districts so as to maximize his party's expected seat share. The designer faces both …

Liberty, security, and accountability: The rise and fall of illiberal democracies

G Gratton, BE Lee - Review of Economic Studies, 2024 - academic.oup.com
We study a model of the rise and fall of illiberal democracies. Voters value both liberty and
economic security. In times of crisis, voters may prefer to elect an illiberal government that …

Rationality-robust information design: Bayesian persuasion under quantal response

Y Feng, CJ Ho, W Tang - Proceedings of the 2024 Annual ACM-SIAM …, 2024 - SIAM
Classic mechanism/information design imposes the assumption that agents are fully
rational, meaning each of them always selects the action that maximizes her expected utility …

Evidence acquisition and voluntary disclosure

D Shishkin - Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on …, 2021 - dl.acm.org
A sender seeks hard evidence to persuade a receiver to take a certain action. There is
uncertainty about whether the sender obtains evidence. If she does, she can choose to …

Persuasion with non-linear preferences

A Kolotilin, R Corrao, A Wolitzky - arxiv preprint arxiv:2206.09164, 2022 - arxiv.org
In persuasion problems where the receiver's action is one-dimensional and his utility is
single-peaked, optimal signals are characterized by duality, based on a first-order approach …

Conveying value via categories

P Onuchic, D Ray - Theoretical Economics, 2023 - Wiley Online Library
A sender sells an object of unknown quality to a receiver who pays his expected value for it.
Sender and receiver might hold different priors over quality. The sender commits to a …