We offer a general framework for theorizing about the structure of knowledge and belief in
terms of the comparative normality of situations compatible with one's evidence. The guiding …

We give a probabilistic analysis of inductive knowledge and belief and explore its
predictions concerning knowledge about the future, about laws of nature, and about the …

We often claim to know what might be—or probably is—the case. Modal knowledge along
these lines creates a puzzle for information-sensitive semantics for epistemic modals. This …

The received view says that possibility is the dual of necessity: a proposition is
(metaphysically, logically, epistemically etc.) possible iff it is not the case that its negation is …

According to a thesis famously associated with Intention, knowledge is a necessary
condition of intentional action: when acting intentionally, we know what we are doing. Call …

Inquiry aims at knowledge. Your inquiry into a question succeeds just in case you come to
know the answer. However, combined with a common picture on which misleading evidence …

In considering what we ought to say, we can evaluate a proposition both for whether it is
assertable and for how assertable it is. The latter notion, that of comparative assertability …

This paper models knowledge in cases where an agent has multiple experiences over time.
Using this model, we introduce a series of observations that undermine the pretheoretic idea …

There is a large literature exploring how accuracy constrains rational degrees of belief. This
paper turns to the unexplored question of how accuracy constrains knowledge. We begin by …

The safety conception of knowledge holds that a belief constitutes knowledge iff relevantly
similar beliefs—its epistemic counterparts—are true. It promises an instructive account of …