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When can we learn general-sum Markov games with a large number of players sample-efficiently?
Multi-agent reinforcement learning has made substantial empirical progresses in solving
games with a large number of players. However, theoretically, the best known sample …
games with a large number of players. However, theoretically, the best known sample …
Empirical Game Theoretic Analysis: A Survey
In the empirical approach to game-theoretic analysis (EGTA), the model of the game comes
not from declarative representation, but is derived by interrogation of a procedural …
not from declarative representation, but is derived by interrogation of a procedural …
Model-based multi-agent rl in zero-sum markov games with near-optimal sample complexity
Model-based reinforcement learning (RL), which finds an optimal policy after establishing an
empirical model, has long been recognized as one of the cornerstones of RL. It is especially …
empirical model, has long been recognized as one of the cornerstones of RL. It is especially …
Hardness of independent learning and sparse equilibrium computation in markov games
We consider the problem of decentralized multi-agent reinforcement learning in Markov
games. A fundamental question is whether there exist algorithms that, when run …
games. A fundamental question is whether there exist algorithms that, when run …
What game are we playing? end-to-end learning in normal and extensive form games
Although recent work in AI has made great progress in solving large, zero-sum, extensive-
form games, the underlying assumption in most past work is that the parameters of the game …
form games, the underlying assumption in most past work is that the parameters of the game …
Communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria
For a constant ϵ, we prove a (N) lower bound on the (randomized) communication
complexity of ϵ-Nash equilibrium in two-player N x N games. For n-player binary-action …
complexity of ϵ-Nash equilibrium in two-player N x N games. For n-player binary-action …
Multiagent evaluation under incomplete information
This paper investigates the evaluation of learned multiagent strategies in the incomplete
information setting, which plays a critical role in ranking and training of agents. Traditionally …
information setting, which plays a critical role in ranking and training of agents. Traditionally …
Towards characterizing the first-order query complexity of learning (approximate) nash equilibria in zero-sum matrix games
In the first-order query model for zero-sum $ K\times K $ matrix games, players observe the
expected pay-offs for all their possible actions under the randomized action played by their …
expected pay-offs for all their possible actions under the randomized action played by their …
Query complexity of approximate Nash equilibria
Y Babichenko - Journal of the ACM (JACM), 2016 - dl.acm.org
We study the query complexity of approximate notions of Nash equilibrium in games with a
large number of players n. Our main result states that for n-player binary-action games and …
large number of players n. Our main result states that for n-player binary-action games and …
Sample-based approximation of Nash in large many-player games via gradient descent
Nash equilibrium is a central concept in game theory. Several Nash solvers exist, yet none
scale to normal-form games with many actions and many players, especially those with …
scale to normal-form games with many actions and many players, especially those with …