When can we learn general-sum Markov games with a large number of players sample-efficiently?

Z Song, S Mei, Y Bai - arxiv preprint arxiv:2110.04184, 2021 - arxiv.org
Multi-agent reinforcement learning has made substantial empirical progresses in solving
games with a large number of players. However, theoretically, the best known sample …

Empirical Game Theoretic Analysis: A Survey

MP Wellman, K Tuyls, A Greenwald - Journal of Artificial Intelligence …, 2025 - jair.org
In the empirical approach to game-theoretic analysis (EGTA), the model of the game comes
not from declarative representation, but is derived by interrogation of a procedural …

Model-based multi-agent rl in zero-sum markov games with near-optimal sample complexity

K Zhang, SM Kakade, T Basar, LF Yang - Journal of Machine Learning …, 2023 - jmlr.org
Model-based reinforcement learning (RL), which finds an optimal policy after establishing an
empirical model, has long been recognized as one of the cornerstones of RL. It is especially …

Hardness of independent learning and sparse equilibrium computation in markov games

DJ Foster, N Golowich… - … Conference on Machine …, 2023 - proceedings.mlr.press
We consider the problem of decentralized multi-agent reinforcement learning in Markov
games. A fundamental question is whether there exist algorithms that, when run …

What game are we playing? end-to-end learning in normal and extensive form games

CK Ling, F Fang, JZ Kolter - arxiv preprint arxiv:1805.02777, 2018 - arxiv.org
Although recent work in AI has made great progress in solving large, zero-sum, extensive-
form games, the underlying assumption in most past work is that the parameters of the game …

Communication complexity of approximate Nash equilibria

Y Babichenko, A Rubinstein - Proceedings of the 49th Annual ACM …, 2017 - dl.acm.org
For a constant ϵ, we prove a (N) lower bound on the (randomized) communication
complexity of ϵ-Nash equilibrium in two-player N x N games. For n-player binary-action …

Multiagent evaluation under incomplete information

M Rowland, S Omidshafiei, K Tuyls… - Advances in …, 2019 - proceedings.neurips.cc
This paper investigates the evaluation of learned multiagent strategies in the incomplete
information setting, which plays a critical role in ranking and training of agents. Traditionally …

Towards characterizing the first-order query complexity of learning (approximate) nash equilibria in zero-sum matrix games

H Hadiji, S Sachs, T van Erven… - Advances in Neural …, 2023 - proceedings.neurips.cc
In the first-order query model for zero-sum $ K\times K $ matrix games, players observe the
expected pay-offs for all their possible actions under the randomized action played by their …

Query complexity of approximate Nash equilibria

Y Babichenko - Journal of the ACM (JACM), 2016 - dl.acm.org
We study the query complexity of approximate notions of Nash equilibrium in games with a
large number of players n. Our main result states that for n-player binary-action games and …

Sample-based approximation of Nash in large many-player games via gradient descent

I Gemp, R Savani, M Lanctot, Y Bachrach… - arxiv preprint arxiv …, 2021 - arxiv.org
Nash equilibrium is a central concept in game theory. Several Nash solvers exist, yet none
scale to normal-form games with many actions and many players, especially those with …