Proportional rules for state contingent claims

S Ertemel, R Kumar - International Journal of Game Theory, 2018 - Springer
We consider rationing problems where the claims are state contingent. Before the state is
realized individuals submit claims for every possible state of the world. A rule distributes …

[BOOK][B] Allocation in networks

JL Hougaard - 2018 - books.google.com
A comprehensive overview of networks and economic design, presenting models and
results drawn from economics, operations research, and computer science; with examples …

A monotonic and merge-proof rule in minimum cost spanning tree situations

M Gómez-Rúa, J Vidal-Puga - Economic Theory, 2017 - Springer
We present a new model for cost sharing in minimum cost spanning tree problems to allow
planners to identify how many agents merge. Under this new framework, in contrast to the …

Sharing sequential values in a network

R Juarez, CY Ko, J Xue - Journal of Economic Theory, 2018 - Elsevier
Consider a sequential process where agents have individual values at every possible step.
A planner is in charge of selecting steps and distributing the accumulated aggregate values …

Minimum cost connection networks: Truth-telling and implementation

JL Hougaard, M Tvede - Journal of Economic Theory, 2015 - Elsevier
In the present paper we consider the allocation of costs in connection networks. Agents have
connection demands in form of pairs of locations they want to have connected. Connections …

Profit-sharing and efficient time allocation

R Juarez, K Nitta, M Vargas - Economic Theory, 2020 - Springer
Agents are endowed with time, which in turn is invested in projects that generate profit. A
mechanism divides the profit generated by these agents depending on the allocation of time …

Free intermediation in resource transmission

L Han, R Juarez - Games and Economic Behavior, 2018 - Elsevier
We provide a framework for the study of the allocation of a divisible resource from a planner
to agents via intermediaries. Intermediaries simultaneously post fees for their services, and …

Fairness and efficiency in cake-cutting with single-peaked preferences

B Bhardwaj, R Kumar, J Ortega - Economics Letters, 2020 - Elsevier
We study the cake-cutting problem where agents have single-peaked preferences over the
cake. We show that a recently proposed mechanism by Wang and Wu (2019) to obtain envy …

Non-cooperative bargaining with unsophisticated agents

KK Trejo, R Juarez, JB Clempner… - Computational Economics, 2020 - Springer
A traditional non-cooperative bargaining situation involves two or more forward-looking
players making offers and counteroffers alternately until an agreement is reached, with a …

Optimality of the uniform rule under single-peaked preferences

R Juarez, JS You - Economic Theory Bulletin, 2019 - Springer
Consider the problem of distributing a fixed amount of a divisible resource among agents
whose preferences are single-peaked. The uniform rule has been widely characterized …